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Abstract 
 This study seeks to use the period of 2011 to 2013, aligned with Jordan’s Arab 
Spring, to identify the extent to which the Islamic Action front and the Jordan Muslim 
Brotherhood underwent political and social movement learning during this time period. I 
used coding of newspaper and newswire service articles to examine how the Islamic 
Action Front and Jordan Muslim Brotherhood participated in protests and to understand 
what their calls for reform and cross-ideological cooperation with other political and 
social movements implied for their own future in the Jordanian political system. 
Additionally, previous survey data from other researchers was incorporated to provide a 
context for what level of support the Brotherhood and its political party have today in 
Jordan’s semiauthoritarian political sphere. This study found that the Islamic Action 
Front and the Jordan Muslim Brotherhood used strategic cooperation with other 
Jordanian organizations and movements in order to heighten pressure on the Jordanian 
government to undertake reform, despite the regime’s strict control over the Islamists’ 
ability to have power in parliament and within the political system. 
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Note on transliteration from the Arabic language to English 
 
 The method used for transliteration in this work adopts a system similar to that 
used by Jillian Schwedler in her book “Faith in moderation: Islamist parties in Jordan 
and Yemen” (2006, p. xxi). To maintain the accessibility of this work to a non-Arabic 
speaking audience, this transliteration system represents only the medial ‘ayn, ‘ghayn, 
and hamza, save for rendering proper names. Arabic words appear in italics (e.g., 
shari‘a). Proper names, most commonly those of Islamist leaders in this work, are often 
transliterated multiple ways depending on the news source. An effort has been made to 
ensure that all Arabic words follow my set forth system of transliteration with an Arabic 
professor at my university. All proper names will not appear italicized. I take fault for 
any erroneous translations based on the system I have set forth above. 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbreviations and acronyms 
 
CSS-          Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan 
HCCNOP-   The Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties  
IAF-          Islamic Action Front 
JMB-          Society of Muslim Brothers in Jordan or Jordan Muslim Brotherhood 
MENA-        Middle East and North Africa region 
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Introduction 
 
 The protests that spread across many countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region during the early months of 2011, a period commonly referred to 
as the Arab Spring, brought an unexpected upheaval of long-entrenched regimes. The 
leaders of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya were toppled. Yemen 
eventually saw a transfer in power of its top leadership, and the Syrian regime became 
embroiled in civil war. In Jordan, the Hashemite monarchy did not face calls for its 
overthrow, but instead faced heightened pressure for political and economic reform.  
 With an unprecedented wave of unrest sweeping the region, the political 
opportunity arose for the Islamic Action Front (IAF), a historical leader of government 
opposition in Jordan, to re-emerge and lead protests against policies of the Jordanian 
monarchy and government in the spring of 2011 and the years following. The IAF is 
considered the political arm of the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and acts 
in coordination with its policies despite their registration as separate entities. Even though 
the IAF and the Jordan Muslim Brotherhood (JMB) face a restricted political sphere and 
the Jordanian regime has remained relatively stable (with the help of fiduciary support 
from other countries), these two Islamist movements nonetheless chose to ratchet up their 
participation and leadership in protests during the Arab Spring. 
 The focus of this research paper is to understand to what extent protests led by the 
IAF and JMB since the beginning of the Arab Spring (2011 to 2013) reflect their learning 
as political and social movements and the formation of strategies by these Islamist 
movements to bolster their support among the Jordanian population. Building on the 
work of Nathan Brown (2012), it is important in the context of Jordan to improve our 
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understanding of how and why Islamist parties compete in Middle East political systems 
under authoritarian regime even when there is currently no chance of ruling over the 
government. The upsurge in protest activity in Jordan during the Arab Spring provides 
the perfect case study in which to explore what the calls for political and economic 
reforms and protest leadership by the IAF and JMB means for the future of their 
movements and the Jordanian political system.   
 To fully understand the historical context from which the JMB and IAF arose 
within the Hashemite kingdom, this paper begins by providing the historical background 
of both the JMB and the more recent history of the IAF (which was formed in 1992). The 
JMB’s historical relationship with the Jordanian monarchy has been one of peaceful 
opposition, however, the entry of the IAF into parliament as the JMB’s de facto political 
party has significantly elevated the level of contention and tension between the leaders of 
the Islamist groups and the regime. Despite the mooring of Islamists in the promotion of 
societal adherence to Islamic values and shari‘a law, the recent history and the findings 
section in this paper show some interesting changes in the current issue areas of concern 
for the JMB and IAF. 
 Turning next to a review of scholarship, this paper identifies key theoretical 
frameworks that have been used to understand Islamic political movements and the role 
they play, specifically in the Middle East, in political systems that operate under 
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. Recent work by Wickham (2013), Schwedler 
(2006; 2011), Clark (2006), and Browers (2009) has examined factors such as leaders, 
individuals, and cross-ideological cooperation in order to understand how Islamist 
movements moderate, change ideological stances, or choose to formally enter their 
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country’s (often restricted) political sphere over time. This paper will seek to move 
beyond a focus on Islamist movements’ moderation and ideological commitments and 
change over time, and instead seek to provide a theoretical link between Islamist social 
and political movement learning and mass mobilization to understand the protest 
activities of the JMB and IAF during the Arab Spring and the implications they have for 
the movements’ futures.  
 To draw the link between social movement theory and the actions taken by 
Jordanian Islamists during the Arab Spring, I employed a methodology primarily based in 
the coding of newspaper articles on all reported protests (under the stipulation of some 
criteria) in which the JMB and IAF led or participated in from 2011 to 2013. With 
original data on protests that reveals the current state of the JMB and IAF, the reforms 
they called for during the Arab Spring, and what their leaders say about their movements’ 
commitments to democracy and principles of governance, a clearer picture emerges of 
how the IAF and JMB have changed over time and what goals they have today. In 
supplementing the data I collected with surveys of Jordan’s general and Muslim 
populations, this research brings explanatory power to the effects of the Jordanian public 
and government on the strategic positioning used by the JMB and IAF to gain further 
support from and exert greater influence over Jordanian society. 
 
Historical background of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan 
 
 The Muslim Brotherhood Society in Jordan was founded in November 1945 by 
Sheikh Abd al-Latif Abu Qurrah and became registered as a charitable organization in 
Jordan in January 1946 (Wickham, 2013, p.197). The parent organization of the JMB, the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (founded in 1928), would provide some influence over the 
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beliefs and values of its sister organization, but ultimately the two groups would take 
different political trajectories due to their distinctly different relationships with their state 
governments. 
 The JMB developed a relationship with the Hashemite monarchy at the 
organization’s inception that has proven crucial to the movement’s survival and 
continued to shape the group’s relationship with the monarchy to the present day. King 
Abdullah I attended the first meeting of the JMB, cementing the Brotherhood’s 
relationship with the monarchy as one characterized by a lack of confrontation and built 
upon family ties between early JMB East Bank leaders and regime officials. This 
relationship allowed the JMB to receive a special status as a “general multi-function 
Islamic group,” which allowed it to expand its activities and message to mosques and 
other public places without any interference from the state (Wickham, 2013, p. 197). 
 Early on, despite some internal debate over the benefits of political participation, 
the JMB had candidates enter as independents in the parliamentary elections of 1951 and 
1954 and as candidates for the Muslim Brotherhood in 1956. In both 1954 and 1956, 
Brotherhood members won 10% of the available parliamentary seats. While holding 
parliamentary seats does not indicate that the Brotherhood had the power to guide the 
direction of the state, it does show that the movement was beginning to grow in 
popularity in the kingdom. According to Nathan Brown, the JMB maintained a 
comfortable space for opposition under the regime, where it could criticize the 
government for not pursuing fuller implementation of shari‘a law, and in so doing 
appease its conservative middle class followers (2012, p. 188-89). While it could be 
critical of the government on some cultural issues, the Brotherhood continued to (and still 
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continues to) stay within the “boundaries of peaceful opposition” in Jordan (Brown, 
2012, p. 189). Wickham notes that the JMB’s generally peaceful relationship with the 
regime allowed it to avoid Jordan’s ban on political parties in 1956 (due to a separate 
non-party association status), and in a move to protect itself from Arab nationalists taking 
power (who were more likely to be anti-Islamist) the JMB sided with the monarchy in the 
late 1950s and 1960s amid opposition protests (2013). 
 The JMB’s relationship with the regime has not been without some tension and 
the Jordanian government has kept a watchful eye over the movement and it’s activities 
throughout its history. Wiktorowicz explains that legal codes and administrative 
procedures are manipulated in Jordan to favor moderate social movement organizations 
like the JMB and IAF over the ability of radical Islamic activists to spread their beliefs 
(2004, p. 13). Brown and Hamzawy cite however that even in a time of less tension 
between the regime and Brotherhood in the 1950s through the 1970s, top Brotherhood 
leaders were arrested for political offenses (2010, p. 50). The Jordanian government as a 
way to coopt Brotherhood leaders, has brought them into top ministry and cabinet 
positions in order to tie them more closely to the ruling monarchy. In one of the other 
great political crises for the regime, when armed Palestinian groups posed a direct threat 
to Jordanian sovereignty in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the JMB stood neutral to 
preserve its power despite some of its members belonging to these groups and the 
expelled Palestine Liberation Organization. 
 In 1989, major riots occurred in Jordan over severe International Monetary Fund 
austerity measures imposed on the Jordanian government to end subsidies for food and 
other common items. In order to appease the protesters and end the political unrest with 
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some measures of political liberalization, King Hussein called for the first general 
parliamentary elections since they were suspended in 1967. The regime’s opening 
towards opposition voices led to increased political participation for the Brotherhood, 
with JMB members winning over a quarter of the seats in parliament (85% of the seats 
they contested) and Brotherhood members also participating in drafting a new National 
Charter for the country in 1990, which intended to provide guidelines for political party 
activity in the state (Wickham, 2013). The National Charter served the Islamist 
opposition well to the degree that it enshrined respect for political pluralism, the status of 
shari‘a as the source of legislation, and Islam as the state religion (The Jordanian 
National Charter). 
 Through this time of protest and reconciliation of political values, King Hussein 
allowed parliament’s passage of a new political parties law in 1992, which the 
Brotherhood would seize upon to form their own political branch that same year under 
the name of the Islamic Action Front (IAF). While the IAF is a separate legal entity from 
the JMB, the IAF has deferred to the Brotherhood on critical decisions and almost by 
default they tend to select the candidate proposed by the Brotherhood to be the IAF’s 
next leader (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010, p. 53). Formation of the IAF allowed the 
Brotherhood a new opportunity to expand its appeal to other Islamists outside of its 
movement and to extend greater mobilization of its views in parliament and into the 
public eye. 
 The IAF’s electoral history has been one marked by both the Jordanian 
government’s manipulation of the electoral law and internal division among the party in 
forming its electoral tactics. After the Brotherhood had success in gaining 22 seats filled 
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by its members or aligned candidates in 1989, the IAF’s 1992 formation and the JMB’s 
1989 electoral success drew regime concern towards rising Islamist power in the country. 
With the Islamists’ power increasing, their rise in power is speculated to have been the 
reason that the King and his cabinet decided to make amendments to the electoral law 
four months before the 1993 elections that would end up diminishing the IAF’s ability to 
win seats.   
 The 1993 constitutional amendment changed the structure of the voting system 
with voters formerly being able to cast votes for as many candidates as there were seats in 
the multi-member districts (i.e., three votes for a district with three seats up for election) 
to being able to only cast one vote (and the top three vote getters winning seats) in each 
multi-member district. This had an effect on many voters to choose a candidate based 
along their family and tribal lines, which could offer better connections and state 
patronage, over party orientations or their Islamic values (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010, p. 
60). On top of this electoral amendment, a continued source of complaints for the IAF 
has been the skewed set-up of the electoral system, which provides over-representation 
for rural tribal areas traditionally supportive of the monarchy and less representation in 
traditional Brotherhood strongholds of urban areas with majority Palestinian populations. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the IAF still managed to win 16 of 80 seats in the 1993 elections 
despite the new electoral law being skewed against them, which could be attributed to 
their recent successful and popular entry onto the country’s political scene (Brown and 
Hamzawy, 2010, p. 61). 
 Even with the Jordanian monarchy’s restrictions on the ability of media and 
political parties to operate as freely as they would in a western democracy, Schwedler 
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notes that IAF has not chosen to halt its activities despite Jordan’s “stalled” state of true 
democratic transition (2006, p. 29). Since the mid-1990s, the IAF has seen changes in its 
“political structures (e.g., committee structures) and practices (e.g., reform demands) 
even though the same regime remains in power and democratic processes are superficial 
(parenthetical notes added by the researcher, Schwedler, 2006, p. 29). Thus, as will be 
seen from the IAF’s electoral and political history to date, the party has continued to 
value having a voice in Jordan’s political sphere even if that space remains restricted.  
 Since the 1993 elections, factions within the IAF have been divided over the 
number of candidates to run for office and whether or not to boycott elections in order to 
attempt to force the regime to change the rules governing the electoral system. In 1997, 
the IAF boycotted elections for the first time, but with a lack of success in altering the 
electoral rules of the game, the IAF re-entered the political sphere for the 2003 elections 
(King Abdullah II suspended parliament from 2001-2003). The IAF’s return to politics 
showed their recognition that parliament was the least-restrictive sphere in which the 
party could raise its political and ideological views.  
 In 2003, the IAF would reclaim 17 seats, similar to its 1993 results, but now in an 
expanded parliament of 110 members (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010, p. 61). It is also 
important to note that the IAF has run fewer candidates than there are seats in every 
election in which it has participated. This strategy comes from the party’s own choice to 
exercise self-restraint under the assumption that the regime will continue to restrict the 
party or political party system if the IAF has a chance to gain real power over parliament. 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt used a similar strategy under the rule of Mubarak 
when they remained publicly cautious of the potential implications of their public 
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activities after he allowed them greater societal space to carry out their mission. While 
the choice of self-restraint has merit, it also translates to the Jordan parliamentary setting 
as a factor that minimizes the political power the IAF can attain. 
 Tensions between the regime and the IAF and JMB have periodically flared up 
over the last decade and a half, particularly around the Brotherhood’s stance on issues 
related to Jordan’s foreign policy. Opposition from the Brotherhood and a coalition of 
secular groups to the Jordanian government’s normalization of relations with Israel in 
1994 has continually caused a thorn in the side of regime, with violent protests erupting 
in 1997 and 2000 often centered around aggressive Israeli actions or to support 
Palestinian uprisings against the “Israeli occupation” (Clark, 2006, p. 544). The IAF’s 
support of Hamas (despite that group’s use of violence) and support for insurgency 
against occupation in Iraq have also drawn a disdainful eye from the Jordanian 
government and the Jordanian public, who carry skepticism towards support of those 
causes (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010, p. 59). What remains clear is that even though the 
JMB and IAF do not openly criticize the monarchy, the groups have taken stances that 
are visibly at odds with the foreign policy strategies used by the regime. 
 In more recent electoral history the IAF has not fared well. Internal disagreement 
over which candidates and how many to run in the 2007 elections led to the party’s worst 
result to date with only six candidates winning their elections (Brown and Hamzawy, 
2010, p. 63). The IAF, in continued opposition to the voting and representation issues 
within the government’s electoral system, has subsequently boycotted the last two 
parliamentary elections held in 2010 and 2013. Despite, some internal discord within the 
IAF and correspondingly the JMB, Brown cites that angry factions tend to stay in the 
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movement due to the deep and personal bonds formed among members (2012, p. 129-
30). Since entering politics, Brown explains that the IAF and many Islamist groups in 
general have a great capacity to learn. “Each election is followed by a series of studies 
and debates; each parliamentary session is followed by an accounting and a report; each 
strategic decision is reviewed for lessons learned” (Brown, 2012, p. 230). 
 Wickham cites the mid-1990s as the greatest ideological shift of the IAF to this 
date, from a focus on religious matters to government political and democratic reform 
(2013). However, Brown also offers the lead-up to 2003 elections, in which the IAF 
participated, as an important moment for the movement as well. The IAF’s platform in 
2003 gave few details on how to ensure further implementation of the shari‘a in society 
and instead drew focus to broader political reform and economic grievances that could be 
portrayed as part of a well-rounded Islamic agenda (Brown, 2012, p. 190). With this shift 
developing over the past decade, the years of the Arab Spring and its immediate 
aftermath (2011-2013), represents a new case study to examine whether the numerous 
protests of the present time period indicate a renewed or different shift towards calls for 
democratic and political reform than the past.  
 
Review of scholarship on Islamist politics under authoritarian regimes 
 
 Political Islam or Islamism is defined by Guilain Denoeux as “a form of 
instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups, and organizations, that pursue 
political objectives” (as cited in Ayoob, 2008, p. 2). Under this definition, Islamism 
“provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the 
foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the 
Islamic tradition” (Ayoob, 2008, p. 2). Mohammed Ayoob’s (2008) work presents a 
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clearer picture of Islamist movements today, portraying these politically and religiously 
minded groups not as a monolith but as having differing views in the role they believe 
Islam should have in their state. For some Islamist groups, their goal is to see Islam and 
its values given a more prominent role in the state’s national life and symbols, while 
other groups seek a radical political transformation of the state into a theocracy or 
renewed caliphate.   
  The past few decades have seen a rise in political science scholarship in 
modernization theory and specifically into how states’ democratic transitions may be 
impacted by Islamist groups. For current and recently fallen long-standing authoritarian 
regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Islamist groups have often 
represented their most significant opposition. Some prominent theorists, such as Samuel 
P. Huntington, have raised questions as to whether or not Islamism and democracy can be 
compatible and if particularly radical Islamist groups can moderate to the extent that they 
lead in a country’s democratic transition.  
 For Huntington, the world is in a state of a clash of civilizations, leading to the 
potential for conflicts between predominately Muslim countries and Western 
predominately Christian countries. Huntington’s view of “democracy as a political form 
of Western civilization” aligns well with the viewpoint of Islamism’s incompatibility 
with democracy when combined with Wiktorowicz’s analysis that Islamist groups have 
used anti-Western rhetoric and mobilized support to rebuff the “Western ‘attack on 
Islam’” (1996, p. 43; 2002, p. 194). Additionally, Huntington believes Islam and 
democracy are incompatible because Islam does not recognize a division between 
“church” and state, and because the religion promotes community over the individual. 
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For Huntington, the individual spirit is a key asset to liberal democratic orders (as cited in 
Jamal, 2006, p. 53). 
 Despite examples of anti-Western views being espoused by some Islamist groups, 
researchers have also found Islamist movements willing to embrace the principles and 
processes of democracy that are more commonly associated with today’s societies in the 
West. Especially in the MENA region, where Islamists have long faced repression under 
authoritarian regimes, democratic ideals provide a method that can be used to open and 
grow public participation in their political system and support for their political parties. 
Defining what democracy means in the MENA region, where it has little historical track 
record, is difficult. A common definition for democracy used by political theorist Robert 
A. Dahl provides five criteria for the democratic process: “(1) effective participation, (2) 
equality in voting, (3) gaining enlightened understanding (learning about alternative 
policies and their consequences), (4) exercising final control over the agenda, and (5) 
inclusion of adults” (parenthetical note added by the researcher, 1998, p. 38). In terms of 
the institutions deemed necessary for large-scale democracy, Dahl offers six: “(1) elected 
officials, (2) free, fair, and frequent elections, (3) freedom of expression, (4) alternative 
sources of information, (5) associational autonomy (independent from government), and 
(6) inclusive citizenship” (parenthetical note added by the researcher, 1998, p. 85). 
 Examination of Islamist groups’ beliefs through interviews of their leaders, 
reports on protests, and official statements has helped inform the field of political science 
on how these groups view democratic processes and the value (if any) they place in the 
importance of democratic institutions. With many regimes in the MENA region having 
developed limited forms of the democratic processes and institutions as described by 
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Dahl, a number of political scientists have focused their research on why and how 
Islamist groups choose to participate in the limited opportunities for political 
participation provided by regimes, particularly if the Islamists had previously promoted 
violent opposition towards their country’s regime (Wickham, 2013; Clark, 2006; 
Wiktorowicz, 2002; Schwedler, 2006; Browers, 2009). To understand these processes of 
Islamist movement change and incorporation of democratic values and to exhibit their 
applicability to the Jordanian context requires turning first to the dominant theoretical 
frameworks constructed to explain these phenomena.  
 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham (2013) draws upon a long-term historical analysis of 
Muslim Brotherhood branches and their associated parties to form a baseline for 
comparing and understanding the development of these Islamist movements over time. 
She echoes Ayoob from the vantage point that Islamist movements are not monolithic in 
nature and she adds that ideational change and moderation within a movement is non-
linear and may occur in some parts of a movement and not others (Wickham, 2013). 
Furthermore, in addressing the degree to which Islamist groups moderate and change 
their behavior based upon ideational changes towards democracy, Wickham sets a high 
bar for evaluating movement embrace of democratic values. She looks for movement 
rhetoric and leaders’ views to move beyond support of just procedural aspects of 
democracy (e.g., free and fair elections) towards support for democratic principles 
including those of tolerance for other religions, a commitment to individual rights and 
freedoms, and acceptance of the existence of different interpretations of Islam (Wickham, 
2013, p. 6).  
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 The second main area that Wickham draws attention to after ideational change is 
how strategic adaptation may affect Islamist attitudes towards democracy and the 
political system in which they are situated. As Islamist actors “enter a new institutional 
environment, they are under pressure to conform with its established rules of speech and 
conduct,” which Wickham argues could internalize behavioral change (2013, p. 12). 
Forming a connection to social constructivist literature, she draws links to the effects that 
interaction with other actors (e.g., political leaders, public officials) may serve as a causal 
factor to precipitate change in Islamist groups’ beliefs. Built upon an analysis of the 
historical understanding of these movements and the impact of ideational change and 
strategic adaptation on political participation, Wickham’s central hypothesis states, 
“observable changes in Islamist group rhetoric and behavior cannot be explained as an 
outcome of either strategic adaptation or ideational change but rather exhibit features of 
both” (emphasis added by author, Wickham, 2013, p. 17).  
 Jillian Schwedler brings a closer look at moderation of Islamist movements as a 
result of their inclusion in the political process. In her examination of theories on 
moderation as part of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, she disaggregates the concept 
of moderation into three areas: 
1) the strategic behavior of moderates and radicals working within particular 
structural constraints; 2) attitudinal evidence about varying levels of tolerance 
between inclusive and exclusive political actors; or, less commonly, 3) the 
evolution of a political actor in terms of her actions, beliefs, and objectives before 
and after political inclusion (Schwedler, 2006, p. 21-22). 
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Schwedler’s research seeks further evidence of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis in 
the Middle East context, particularly in Jordan and Yemen (2006). She builds upon work 
by other scholars such as Huntington (1991), Kalyvas (2000), and Przeworksi and 
Sprague (1986), who used empirical evidence to show how strongly ideological socialist 
and Catholic political parties in the 20th century compromised on their political objectives 
when entering and settling into their respective political systems (Schwedler, 2011, p. 
353-354).  
 Schwedler contends in her work that a government’s inclusion of a group (e.g., in 
elections and a legislative body) can discourage radicalism and have the overall effect of 
political moderation. Studies by Omar Ashour cite the example of the “de-radicalization” 
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s due to the allowance of a greater 
number of opportunities to be active in civil society by the government (as cited in 
Schwedler, 2011, p. 356). Schwedler believes however that political inclusion is 
insufficient as a cause for the ideological moderation of a group (Schwedler, 2006). To 
explain what she means by moderation, Schwedler describes that: 
 […] in broad terms, moderation entails a process of change that might be 
described as movement along a continuum from radical to moderate, whereby a 
move away from more exclusionary practices (of the sort that view all alternative 
perspectives as illegitimate and thus dangerous) equates to an increase in 
moderation (2007, p. 59). 
Therefore, for Schwedler, the terms “moderate” and “moderation” are not a category for 
Islamist groups but are part of an ongoing process that these groups are involved in.  
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 In the theoretical area of moderation, Schwedler and Wickham operate from 
perspectives that are not mutually exclusive. First, in terms of a group undergoing 
moderation, Schwedler points out that not all groups begin as radical entities. She cites 
the example of the JMB, which has a historically close relationship with the Hashemite 
monarchy. The Jordanian Brotherhood has never radicalized and instead maintains a 
moderate stance and has increased its engagement in “pluralist and inclusive practices of 
the sort we would recognize as moderate” (Schwedler, 2007, p. 60). Second, both 
Schwedler and Wickham recognize the importance of internal debates to causing 
ideological moderation. Wickham cites that individuals have their identities and beliefs 
constructed in their institutional and cultural environments and then use them to drive 
political action (2013, p. 11).  The IAF presented an example of this in the 1990s when 
they debated internally to accept limited cooperation with ideological rivals (communist 
and socialist parties) based partially on their value of democratic participation 
(Schwedler, 2007, p. 60). 
 After examining what factors affect Islamist movement change, including 
strategic adaptation, ideational change, and inclusion-moderation theory, an additional 
area of study is the effect of cross-ideological cooperation on movement change. Janine 
Clark conducted a case study of the IAF in Jordan on the party’s involvement in the 
Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP) 
(2006). Clark sought to examine the significance of cooperation with other parties for 
moderation of Islamist groups and if there might be an impact on overall political 
liberalization and democratization in Jordan. Through studying the IAF’s response to 
three laws that came before the HCCNOP in the areas of ending the legality of honor 
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crimes, establishing a quota for women’s seats in parliament, and granting women greater 
divorce rights, Clark looked to see whether the IAF’s actions showed any substantive 
ideological change or moderation (2006, p. 540). 
 Clark found that the IAF, while cooperating with the HCCNOP on a number of 
international affairs issues (e.g., opposition to the treaty with Israel), showed less 
attention to domestic issues and less willingness to tackle contentious areas such as 
women’s rights. As the strongest party the IAF had the greatest influence over the 
committee’s agenda, and HCCNOP members agreed to keep controversial items based in 
strong ideology or religion, here divorce rights and honor killings laws, off the table for 
discussion. The lack of IAF willingness to discuss these issues showed self-imposed “red 
lines” existed that limited the party’s engagement in substantive areas of democracy (e.g., 
women’s equal rights with men) and therefore led to little to no ideological moderation 
(Clark, 2006, p. 556). Thus, for Clark, her research questions the strength of the 
“inclusion leads to moderation hypothesis” specifically as it concerns cross-ideological 
cooperation with other groups. 
 A final wrinkle to the theoretical concerns with cross-ideological cooperation as a 
cause of moderation is posed by Michaelle Browers. Browers portrays moderation with 
an emphasis on the individual versus a whole group or party. She sees the individual as 
being in wasatiyya or “in the middle” between left and right political orientations and not 
moderating from one extreme to this middle point (Browers, 2009, p. 48-49). In terms of 
political parties, Browers sees individuals in and outside of a group causing its 
moderation instead of moderation caused by the overall work of the party (2009, p. 9). 
These additional insights from Browers’ research brings further doubts on cooperation as 
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a cause for ideological change, but her work also highlights the importance of leaders 
within movements to bring about substantive change like following democratic 
principles. 
 The frameworks developed around Islamist movement change by Wickham, 
Clark, Schwedler, and Browers each provide a strong theoretical basis for the causes that 
underpin Islamist movements’ reasons for moderation and/or entrance into the semi-
democratic institutions and processes of their respective country’s regime. While these 
frameworks provide a foundation for how the IAF and JMB have developed up until and 
partially through the Arab Spring, they do not fully account for the processes of social 
movement learning and the underpinning reasons for the strategic decisions made by the 
IAF and JMB from 2011 to 2013.  
 In the context of Jordan’s Arab Spring, Wickham’s hypothesis reveals some likely 
strategic adaptation on the part of the IAF to cancel their participation in elections and to 
promote calls for greater democratization and government accountability, however, 
ideational change during this time is more difficult to prove. Schwedler’s focus on the 
“inclusion leads to moderation” hypothesis may shed light on why the IAF entered 
politics and what types of moderation take place, but it carries less explanatory power in 
this study due to the lack of new political openings provided by the Jordanian 
government. Clark and Browers raise important concerns about the insignificant effect of 
cross-ideological cooperation on the IAF if it does not make more commitments to 
substantive areas of democracy. Mark Beissinger, however, might counter that the 
evidence of mass urban collective action, with significant cross-ideological cooperation 
seen in protests, may not indicate a more substantive commitment to democracy for the 
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IAF and JMB but it could have an impact on their power to pressure regime and/or 
government change (2013). 
 The final theoretical framework that needs to be established takes this research a 
step further than the foundation of how Islamists moderate, cooperate, and show 
commitment to democratic principles. A focus on social and political movement learning 
is key to understanding what the IAF’s and JMB’s involvement in the Arab Spring mean 
for those movements and the strategic approaches they took to attempt to achieve their 
political and philosophical goals. Brown (2012) explains that by entering the political 
system in Jordan, the IAF has chosen to “play the game” of the political system under a 
semiauthoritarian regime. He states that “[t]hey respond cautiously, unevenly, and 
slowly. And they complain. But they still position themselves to take advantage of the 
limited opportunities presented by semiauthoritarianism” (Brown, 2012, p. 126). Islamic 
movement members’ participation in politics affects their movement in a variety of ways, 
from diverting their resources towards campaigns, to raising suspicion and hostility from 
other political parties, and changing the time horizon on which leaders focus to 
implement Islamic ideals in society from a long term view to the short term of an election 
cycle (Brown, 2012, p. 133-34). 
 As Islamists begin to find themselves regularly running for elections, their 
participation can cause them to adjust their interactions with the public and their 
coordination with other political parties. Clark and Beissinger might agree that Islamists’ 
cross-ideological cooperation with other parties may not lead to further embrace of 
democratic principles, however, as this paper’s findings section will show, this 
cooperation can have implications for mobilization that leads to government reform. The 
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importance of applying a framework of political and social movement learning to the 
entire IAF and JMB respectively (over an emphasis placed only on their leaders) will 
allow for meaningful interpretation of the protest data collected for this research and a 
better understanding of the how the Arab Spring affected these movements. Additionally, 
Beissinger’s (2013) research on mobilization success of revolutionary movements will 
also bring to bear interesting implications for the protests carried out in Jordan (discussed 
in the findings section) and other countries in the Middle East during the Arab Spring. 
 
Methodology 
 
 This research project draws upon a mixed method approach that incorporates use 
of secondary survey data of Jordanians collected by multiple research organizations, 
newspaper articles on protests involving the IAF and JMB from 2011 to 2013 with 
coding rules developed by the author, and a review of the scholarly literature on Islamist 
movements and democratization in the field of political science. The use of these sources 
provided the best approach, given a number of research limitations (discussed in the next 
section), to understanding the context surrounding the IAF’s and JMB’s involvement in 
protests from 2011 to 2013 and the effect their protest demands had on their movements, 
the Jordanian public, and the Jordan government’s policymaking environment. In using 
the method of coding a collection of newspaper articles and supplementing the data with 
previously collected survey data, I intend to add further depth and understanding to 
political science scholarship of the IAF and JMB and their continued demands for reform 
as they relate to how they shape and operate in the Jordanian political context. 
 The survey data used as part of the analysis found in the findings section of this 
paper captures Jordanians’ sentiment about the role of Islam in society and Jordanian 
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politics, as well as Jordanians’ views on democracy and the protests of the Arab Spring. 
The data from the surveys provide a method for incorporating valuable information into 
the analysis conducted in this research paper that I could not collect myself due to time 
and monetary constraints. The data also serves as method for finding variables that can 
serve as proxies to provide some indication of the Jordanian public’s support for the IAF 
and their calls for democratization and government accountability. Differences in 
questions asked between these surveys and at times between separate waves of the same 
survey make it difficult to account for change in these variables over time. The surveys 
which I utilize for this research include the	  fifth	  wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey, the 
Center for Strategic Studies (at the University of Jordan) 2011 Democracy Poll, the	  second	  wave	  of	  the	  Arab	  Democracy	  Barometer	  survey,	  the	  Pew	  Research	  Center’s	  2012	  report	  on	  Muslims	  and	  democracy	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Global	  Attitudes	  Project,	  and	  
the Pew Research Center’s 2013 report “The	  world’s	  Muslims:	  Religion,	  politics	  and	  
society.”	  	   The core data I collected for this research lies in the 103 protests catalogued and 
coded by examining articles published by international and local Jordanian newspapers 
and newswire services from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2013. The goal of 
collecting data on protests that involved the IAF and JMB was to record the demands of 
these groups, particularly those that related to political reform, economic reform, and 
democratization, during the Arab Spring and its immediate aftermath in Jordan. To 
examine articles from this time period, a search of news articles through the ProQuest 
Newsstand (PQN) search engine with the search terms “Jordan Muslim Brotherhood 
AND Protests NOT Egypt” were used to find all articles that mentioned the JMB’s and 
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IAF’s protest activities during this time period. 1401 search results were returned and 139 
articles were catalogued due to their coverage of protests or interviews with Islamist and 
government leaders about the IAF and JMB protests. 103 total protests would be 
officially coded from the newspaper and electronic media sources. At the beginning of 
this research, the World News Connection article search engine was used with the same 
search terms, however, a switch was made to the PQN service after the World News 
Connection service was discontinued in the spring of 2014. The effect of this switch is 
not verifiable, however, the PQN service appeared to return more results, though many of 
them were duplicates of the same news story coverage. 
 News articles on JMB and IAF protests were coded for this research with the 
following information: title of the news article, name of the article’s news media source, 
the date the protest was held, the date the news article was published, the database from 
which the article was retrieved, the location of the protest in Jordan, the estimated 
number of protest participants, the goals and topics of each protest, and what 
collaborating groups participated in each protest (if any) besides JMB and IAF members. 
The rule I used to qualify whether a gathering was a protest is that at least 20 people were 
present and that the word “protest” was used in the news article. Protest goals and topics 
were recorded as research was conducted and fell under the following categories: 
government accountability (e.g., cracking down on corruption, removal of the Jordanian 
prime minister, dissolution of parliament), electoral reform, economic goals (e.g., protest 
on subsidy cancellations), anti-Israel and Palestinian solidarity, anti-United States, 
solidarity with Syrian rebels, solidarity with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, 
conformity of Jordanian law with shari‘a, releasing jailed protesters from prison, 
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freedom (i.e., for the press and/or individuals), and calls for a more democratic society in 
general. 
 In the findings section of this paper the number of protest goals and themes 
recorded is greater than the number of protests that were coded, as some protests had 
multiple calls for various goals and government reforms. The goals and themes of these 
protests were coded simply for whether or not they were mentioned in each article as part 
of the demands of government and society called for by protesters. The number of 
protesters recorded at a protest relied on estimates from the news sources utilized for this 
research. The rules used to classify what qualifies as a protest were drawn from Mark 
Beissinger’s research on demonstrations in the former Soviet Union and used the 
following five criteria (save for a modification on the cutoff number of participants): 
(1) it was a voluntary gathering of persons with the purpose of engaging in a 
collective display of sentiment for or against public policies; (2) it involved a 
minimum of one hundred persons; (3) it was bounded by space and time (that is, 
occurred in a specific location during a limited time period); (4) the number of 
participants was not restricted by the organizers of the event (that is, it was not a 
conference, convention, or other restricted organization meeting); and (5) it did 
not have as its primary purpose the infliction of violence by its participants (that 
is, was not a mass violent event) (Beissinger, 2002, p. 462).  
I chose to modify the second point of criteria on the number of people that qualifies as a 
protest event from 100 to 20. By lowering the cutoff number, I felt that the research 
gained more of an accurate breadth of understanding of the reform demands issued 
during the protests and the lower minimum number did not change the fact that the 
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protest’s occurrence would become well known because it was already published on in 
the news media.  
 To make the data more digestible on the size of the protests that occurred, I chose 
to break down the protests into categories based on size, with my numerical cutoffs based 
on the more common ranges of protest attendance estimates used by the news sources 
examined. The use of the numerical term “dozens” of people designated a protest as 
having 20 or more people, “hundreds” of people designated a protest as having 100-499 
people, “thousands” of people designated a protest as between 1,000-4,999 people, and 
all other numerical categories (see Table 2) were more accurately stated in the news 
articles. It is important to note that the number of protesters counted at each event is 
based on the account of a single source and is the best information available to determine 
the number of protesters who attended each protest.  
 
Research limitations 
 The primary limitation on this research was the inability to travel to Jordan to 
collect primary data through a survey of the general public about their level of support for 
the IAF as well as conducting interviews of JMB and IAF members on their views of 
democracy and the strategies they used in planning their protests during the Arab Spring 
(which could indicate ideational change and strategic adaptation). Even when researchers 
do have access to the region, interviews with IAF and JMB leaders, and the ability to 
survey the general public, gaining quality data in the MENA region in general can be 
quite difficult. Portions of the Jordanian population may not be familiar with surveys and 
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survey techniques, and survey or interview participants may not always feel comfortable 
with talking to an interviewer about their religious and political beliefs.  
 Additionally, survey data collected from Jordan and the region may not offer a 
true representation of the population depending on who is surveyed and who is 
conducting the survey. Generally, surveys from the organizations cited in this paper such 
as the Pew Research Center and the Center for Strategic Studies are deemed to be 
reputable organizations with excellent research teams, however, even these organizations 
recognize that the data they collect may include some errors. The Pew Research Center 
survey of the world’s Muslims (n = 966), the CSS democracy poll (n = 1,944), and the 
CSS-coordinated Arab Democracy Barometer, Wave II (n = 1,188) all included large 
sample sizes and conducted surveys in Jordan that covered all of its governorates 
(national surveys) with participants proportionate to each governorate’s population. One 
advantage in researching Jordan is that the country and its people are more heavily 
influenced by or accustomed to the West and its researchers than some other Middle 
Eastern countries, making it easier to carry out research in the country. A final limitation 
with using this survey data is that it does not precisely answer the questions that were 
focused on in this research or cover the exact time period analyzed. To accommodate this 
limitation, the survey data was used to form proxy indicators of support for the IAF and 
JMB and identifiers were examined that could explain these movements’ ideological and 
strategic stances.  
 The accuracy of news articles and the self-censorship (or at times direct 
government censorship) of news media sources in Jordan and the MENA region is 
another challenge to producing quality research on political topics in the Middle East. 
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This research relied heavily on articles from “The Jordan Times,” a privately held and 
independent English daily newspaper based in Amman, and a minority of articles from a 
scattering of Middle Eastern and London-based news organizations. “The Jordan Times” 
provided fairly unbiased reporting and published articles during the Arab Spring that 
even reported calls from protesters for the end of the Jordanian monarchy (a punishable 
crime in the Kingdom; however, it is possible that “The Jordan Times” may have 
underreported the amount of protests that took place in the Kingdom involving the JMB 
and IAF from 2011 to 2013 in order to avoid government scrutiny. Due to the lack of 
civil war or regime overthrow in Jordan during the Arab Spring, media organizations 
outside of Jordan paid less attention to ongoing political developments in Jordan, which 
makes it necessary to rely mostly on “The Jordan Times” as a source for news on 
protests. Arabic news sources from Jordan may have provided more information than 
“The Jordan Times,” however, they were not readily accessible in a compiled news 
article database like ProQuest Newsstand. 
 Some inconsistencies also exist in “The Jordan Times” and reports by other news 
sources of the protests that took place in Jordan. In 18 of the protests reported involving 
the IAF and JMB from 2011 to 2013, the article related to the protest did not record the 
number of protesters who attended. This makes it difficult to verify if these protests met 
the rule used in this research that a minimum of 20 people must participate in a gathering 
labeled as a “protest” for it to qualify as a protest. Despite incomplete data, these 18 
protests were incorporated into the overall protest data compiled for this research due to 
the JMB’s and IAF’s protest record of typically organizing or participating in protests 
that numbered in the dozens to hundreds of participants. Overall, even with the 
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limitations that accompany any data and research, the news articles on protests combined 
with survey data still combine to provide a much clearer picture of the Arab Spring in 
Jordan and support for the JMB and IAF. 
 
Model and hypothesis 
 The model for this research relies on a framework consisting of analysis of two 
key components: (1) analyzing the coded data collected from news media articles on 
protests involving the JMB and IAF to quantify and list Jordanian Islamists’ calls for 
democratic political reform, economic reform, and government accountability; and (2) 
incorporation of data from a small group of surveys (e.g., Arab Barometer, Pew reports) 
that can provide proxy indicators of the Jordanian population’s support or lack of support 
for Islamist movements in Jordan as a result of their protests and public rhetoric. Protest 
data from the two-year period from 2011 to 2013 to analyze the various reform demands 
used and co-protest leaders that partnered with the IAF and JMB under a theoretical 
framework of political and social movement learning to gauge how these movements 
adjusted based on their protest participation during this time period.  
 I hypothesize based on my literature review that the protest data on the JMB and 
their political party the IAF, which are the leading Islamist movements in Jordan, will 
show that these movements have significantly increased their calls for democratic 
political reform and government accountability since the beginning of the Arab Spring. 
While this strategy may have increased support for the IAF and JMB at protests and 
support for their specific calls for reform, I think that the survey data drawn from 
multiple sources will show that the Jordanian population is still averse to fully supporting 
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the insertion of Islamic ideals or the demands for a more democratic system into political 
action and discourse in Jordan. 
 
Findings 
 
IAF and JMB reform demands: What the Arab Spring protests tell us 
 
 The examination and analysis of 103 protests led by or involving the JMB and the 
IAF from 2011 to 2013 reveals a moderate degree of strategic adjustment and political 
learning on the part of the Islamist movements that, in accordance with Brown’s (2012) 
analysis, reflects an extension of the IAF’s ideological shift in 2003 to focus more on 
demands for political and economic reform over rhetoric related to firmer implementation 
of shari‘a law. Protests held in Jordan during the Arab Spring did not, for the most part, 
call for the ouster of King Abdullah II but instead demanded a wide array of government 
reforms and openly displayed Jordanians’ concern for their own economic security. The 
choice of the movements to collaborate with other parties to focus on pressuring the 
government over the rise in fuel costs proved to be one rallying point that helped the IAF 
and JMB attract Jordanians to their protests even if fuel prices were not formerly a major 
item on the IAF platform. Despite some internal divisions within the JMB and IAF 
membership and their designation as two separate entities, the two groups tended to act in 
coordination with one another throughout the Arab Spring.  
 Following the ignition of the Arab Spring with massive protests and the 
subsequent downfall of long-standing regimes in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011, the 
IAF seized upon the spread of popular unrest that began in Jordan to take a prominent 
lead among opposition groups traditionally politically opposed to the government to 
invoke demands for a wide variety of reforms from the Jordanian government. Early 
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demands from the opposition called upon the King to create a fairer electoral law for the 
country’s political parties, to crack down on government corruption, and to reverse a hike 
in fuel prices. Protests against corruption and a rise in the price of fuel were not new 
demands from members of opposition parties, however, protests on these topics reached 
such a high frequency during the Arab Spring that they could be viewed as part of the 
IAF’s and JMB’s political learning to strategically seize discourse on matters where they 
can spread their influence and message. The majority of calls for reform issued during 
protests from 2011 to 2013 from protesters across Jordan centered on the theme of 
government accountability to create more democratic, transparent, and representative 
institutions of government and to address Jordan’s woeful economic situation. 
Table 1: Categories of IAF and JMB protest goals and themes from 2011-2013 
Type of protest goal or theme: Number of times a protest goal or theme 
was issued: 
 
Government reform (e.g., corruption, 
electoral system, economic subsidies) 
78 protests 
Expression of solidarity with Palestine and 
call to end peace treaty with Israel 
12 protests 
Expression of solidarity with Syrian rebels 7 protests 
Call for assurance of press and/or 
individual freedoms 
6 protests 
Expression of anti-U.S. sentiment 4 protests 
Expression of solidarity with Egypt’s 
Muslim Brotherhood 
3 protests 
Call for greater democratization in Jordan 2 protests 
Call for further conformity of Jordanian 
law with shari‘a law 
2 protests 
Call for the release of jailed protestors from 
detention 
2 protests 
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 In the 103 protests of the Arab Spring in Jordan spanning 2011 to 2013, it is 
difficult to verify the degree to which the IAF and JMB underwent ideational change (as 
Wickham terms it) towards democracy that would in turn explain the other remaining 
goals and themes for protests used by the JMB and their political party. The JMB has 
consistently called for reform of Jordan’s electoral law since its enactment in 1993 due to 
the dilution in the law’s power granted to parties and the disproportional alignment of 
elected seats to favor the less populous areas inhabited by East Bank tribes traditionally 
supportive of the regime as opposed to more populous majority Palestinian areas. Two 
areas that may reflect some limited ideational change and movement learning towards 
democratic processes for the IAF are the tolerance of and cross-ideological cooperation 
with other opposition parties and movements, discussed by Clark (2006), during the 
protests and the commitment they showed to protesting for individual and press freedoms 
especially in relation to the passage of new restrictive laws on the media. 
 During the protests, the IAF collaborated first with a multi-party coalition that it 
already had membership in, the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National 
Opposition Parties (HCCNOP), which includes six parties with leftist (e.g., communist, 
socialist) political orientations. Over the two-year period from 2011 to 2013, the IAF 
would also come to lead or join in protests with Jordan’s professional associations, trade 
unions, newly formed popular youth movements, tribal groups, and a new opposition 
coalition called the National Front for Reform. These other coalitions often showed more 
concerns with the country’s economic situation and government corruption than the 
IAF’s main concern of electoral reform, but this did not stop these ideologically different 
groups from working together and aligning with each other. 
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 Wickham cites tolerance of other religious groups and competing political parties 
as an important commitment to democratic principles (2013). Additionally, Dahl states, 
“gaining enlightened understanding” of policy alternatives and different ideas should be 
part of the democratic process for groups within society (1998). Clark warns however, 
that cross-ideological cooperation only goes so far to indicate true commitment of the 
IAF to the democratic principle of pluralism (2006). She indicates that even within the 
HCCNOP, the IAF maintains “red lines” over discussion of issues that it feels that only a 
religious party (like itself) should be entitled to decide to bring before parliament (such as 
women’s divorce rights), which lends less credibility to the party’s commitment to 
tolerance for other political opposition groups (2006, p. 556). While I do not have access 
to data related to past protest demonstrations in which the IAF and JMB collaborated 
with other parties, the Islamists do appear to presently show a strong commitment to 
protest collaboration (52% of their protests from 2011 to 2013, see Chart 1) on a wide 
range of issues (see Table 1), regardless of whether some “red lines” still exist. 
 Chart 1: 
   
Jordan's	  Arab	  Spring	  protest	  
leaders	  
IAF	  and	  JMB	  collaboration	  with	  another	  group	  (0.52)	  IAF	  and	  JMB,	  only	  protest	  group	  (0.45)	  Sala[ist	  led	  protest	  (0.03)	  
	   Page	  37	  
 Despite concerns from scholars and pundits that the IAF’s commitment to 
democratic principles may be suspect and likely to change if they ever become the 
majority party in power in parliament, Wickham addresses this issue by saying that this 
line of reasoning is oversimplification in its impossibility to falsify any democratic move 
as bent on seizing power and represents a coordination problem (of thousands of 
individuals) over a long period of time (2013, p. 10). While Wickham and other scholars 
are still critical of the JMB’s democratic values when it has contrasting stances on issues 
like women’s rights, one topical area of the Arab Spring protests that may indicate 
additional ideational change for the JMB and IAF is on individual and press freedoms.  
 In 2011, the Chairman of the Political Department of the IAF, Zaki Bani Rasheed, 
said the following about new restrictions on media outlets that the government (the 
King’s administration) was bringing to parliament: 
 The government is going to Parliament with a number of repressive pieces of 
legislation on the media and public freedoms. Instead of producing a modern law 
to reform the country, this government remains living in the period of political 
repression. (“Protesters call for reform,” The Jordan Times, June 26, 2011) 
With such a strong public stance taken against the government over media and public 
freedoms, it is important to recognize that the IAF takes seriously its commitment to (at 
least some) democratic principles and that this influenced its behavior and rhetoric during 
the protests of the Arab Spring. 
 In an interview in Arabic published and translated online, Zaki Bani Rasheed 
went further to explain the IAF’s commitment to democratic principles and a more 
democratic society: 
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‘We welcome any criticism directed to us. We respect the other opinion and see 
the freedom of expression as a genuine right for all Jordanians to criticize the 
official, party, and popular bodies. We are interested in going ahead with our 
reform programme. We hope that there will be an opportunity for dialogue with 
those who direct accusations to us.’ He says everyone must have his voice heard 
based on true democracy without excluding or marginalizing anyone. He says the 
MB accepts the judgment of the people and the results of the ballot boxes (al-
Dustur, October 14, 2011) 
 This rhetoric from a high-ranking officer in the IAF lends more evidence to the potential 
that the IAF has shifted ideationally over time to become more supportive of democratic 
principles and processes.  
 Strategic adaptation is a second area highlighted by Wickham (2013) as important 
to forming the behavior and rhetoric of the IAF; it could also fall under part of Brown’s 
(2012) discussion of the political learning of the IAF. Strategic adaptation proves much 
simpler to identify through the Arab protests than ideational change, since the data 
readily shows the protests the IAF has attended and what types of calls for reform it 
demanded of the regime. The data compiled in Chart 1 shows that the IAF and JMB were 
the leaders of the Islamist opposition and a prominent leader of the opposition during the 
protests from 2011 to 2013. The high number of protest calls for government 
accountability, electoral reform, and economic reforms (see Table 1) show that the IAF 
was relatively flexible in adapting their calls for reform to the broader demands of the 
opposition as opposed to leading a charge for further implementation of shari‘a law.  
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 The JMB has also taken the opportunity to denounce violence when it occurs and 
involves its members (either as perpetrators or victims) and has historically been viewed 
as a non-violent movement (“Islamists warn against violence, ‘uprising’ should fuel crisis 
continue,” The Jordan Times, November 20, 2012). With a firm stand against violent 
activity, the JMB and IAF are much more easily able to work with other political parties 
in the Jordanian political system. Additionally, 52% of protests with IAF and JMB 
involvement- a majority- included other organizations either as participants or protest co-
leaders (see Chart 1). This data reveals that the IAF and JMB were not alone in their calls 
for reform and sought to form a stronger pluralist coalition. 
 The protests that took place from 2011 to 2013 involved a large number of 
people, which could serve as an explanation for successful strategic adaptation and 
movement learning on the part of the IAF and JMB to promote democratic and other 
government reforms that would draw Jordanians into the street under a common banner. 
Beissinger’s (2013) research on the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine also draws a few 
important commonalities between the color revolutions of countries from the former 
Soviet Union and the countries affected by the Arab Spring in the Middle East. It is likely 
that the IAF and JMB were able to learn quickly from the Egyptian and Tunisian 
examples on how to mobilize people and build off of those revolutions’ momentum. 
Beissinger stresses the importance of symbolic capital (here a time of great upheaval 
across the Middle East) in bringing mass mobilization and a negative coalition together to 
protest the government (2013, p.574). A negative coalition can be made up of a number 
diverse opposition groups but does not necessarily need to be committed to democratic 
principles or strong core demands; we saw this take place in Jordan where the IAF and 
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youth movements joined together in protests without strong common and specific 
demands for reform or strict commitments to advancing democratic principles 
(Beissinger, 2013, p. 574).  
 While the table below shows that the IAF and JMB took part in 68 reported 
protests from 2011 to 2013 that recorded from a hundred to thousands of participants, 
two other points should also be considered in conjunction with these data. The first 
important point is that “The Jordan Times” also published articles related to sit-ins and 
protests that did not involve the IAF or JMB that were held across Jordan over the course 
of this two-year period of the Arab Spring, meaning that protests of various sizes (though 
likely not as big as the IAF or JMB protests) were held and organized without 
coordination with the IAF and JMB. Therefore, the IAF and JMB may have been able to 
draw more protesters to their protests, but they can by no means claim that they were able 
to adapt to become the leader of all opposition groups or speaking for all people in 
Jordan, with a majority of their protests only held in Amman.  
 The second point to consider is that at times during the period from 2011-2013 
significant dissension emerged from youth movements, the prominent National Front for 
Reform, and other opposition groups surrounding concerns of the IAF and JMB hijacking 
the opposition reform agenda with their own Islamic ideological agenda (“Attack exposes 
cracks between Islamists, popular movements,” McClatchy-Tribune Business News, 
January 3, 2012). Heading into 2012, the second year of protests since the beginning of 
the Arab Spring, many groups decided to draw out of IAF and JMB-led protests or to 
host their own protests, since the goals of other opposition groups usually aligned more 
with economic concerns over conditions of International Monetary Fund loans than 
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electoral reform or other issues (The Jordan Times, January 8, 2012). These contentions 
between the opposition continued throughout the period of 2012 through 2013 and by 
early 2013, a smaller proportion of protests were co-sponsored between the JMB and 
other groups than in the previous two years.  
 The six largest protests of the Arab Spring (5,000 people plus) in Jordan involving 
the IAF and JMB show diversity in the demands of these massive demonstrations. Two 
mainstays for the majority of these protests were calls for government accountability 
(specifically for a clamp down on officials’ corruption) and electoral reform (“Protesters 
Call for Political Reform,” The Jordan Times, February 27, 2011; “Islamists lead 
thousands in 'reform' demonstration,” The Jordan Times, March, 6, 2011).  
 
Table 2: Number of protesters at protests involving the IAF & JMB from 2011-2013 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Articles	  that	  reported	  on	  protests	  but	  did	  not	  give	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  number	  of	  protesters	  that	  attended	  a	  protest	  were	  also	  included	  in	  the	  overall	  data	  collected	  on	  protests	  for	  this	  research.	  I	  used	  my	  discretion	  to	  include	  them	  based	  on	  data	  showing	  that	  all	  other	  protests	  involving	  the	  IAF	  and	  JMB	  met	  the	  requirement	  of	  holding	  a	  “protest”	  by	  having	  20	  or	  more	  people	  in	  attendance.	  2	  The	  percentages	  above	  total	  to	  99.9%,	  which	  was	  then	  rounded	  up	  to	  100%.	  	  
Number of participants	   Number of protests	   Percent	  
Not available1	   18	   17.4%	  
20-99 people	   17	   16.5%	  
100-499 people	   24	   23.3%	  
500-999 people	   6	   5.8%	  
1,000-4,999 people	   32	   31.1%	  
5,000+ people	   6	   5.8%	  
Total 103 100%2 
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In two-thirds of protests involving collaborating partners with the JMB and IAF, a 
diverse array of groups from tribal groups (traditionally supportive of the regime) to the 
HCCNOP were part of what Beissinger would call a “negative coalition” carrying forth 
broad and generalized slogans to put pressure on the Jordanian government to change 
certain policies (2013). 
 By the end of 2013, fewer protests were occurring from all opposition groups due 
to a combination of reform demands not being met by the government (e.g., satisfactory 
electoral reform), the JMB being concerned about the military’s coup and suppression of 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s party and movement in Egypt, and the ongoing Syrian civil 
war and its significant impact on Jordanian society. This protest data provides a quality 
indication of how strategic adaptation, particularly in regards to calls for democracy, was 
a factor affecting the IAF’s and JMB’s rhetoric and behavior during the Arab Spring 
protests as they attempted to bolster support for their movement. In order to further 
analyze and provide a more well rounded contextual look at the political and religious 
environments the IAF and JMB operated in during these protests, it is necessary to take a 
final turn to survey data on the opinions of Jordanians related to these movements. 
Survey findings on Jordanian opinions of Islamist politics and democracy 
 A number of surveys of the Jordanian population have been taken in recent years, 
including the year leading up to the Arab Spring and during the Arab Spring, which have 
polled the population for their opinions on democracy and their level of comfort with the 
amount of influence that religion has over the country’s politics. One reason that the IAF 
may have shifted some of its rhetoric towards urging the government to undertake 
democratic reforms during the Arab Spring could be due to a correlation with a change in 
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their internal values over time or the fact that the idea of democracy remains popular 
among Jordanians. In a 2010 poll taken as part of the second wave of the Arab 
Democracy Barometer survey, 64% of Jordanians picked between a 5 and 8 in support of 
democracy on a 1 to 10 scale (10 being the most supportive).  82% of Jordanians 
surveyed also felt that “a democratic political system ([described as] public freedoms, 
guarantees equality in political and civil rights, alternation of power, and accountability 
and transparency of the executive authority) is good or very good,” and a majority were 
opposed to an authoritarian political system (bracketed text added by the researcher, Arab 
Democracy Barometer, Wave II, 2011).  
 Despite the fact that Jordanians generally support democracy and a democratic 
form of governance, the reality is that they still live under a monarch who has given his 
parliament and people limited political and legislative power. There are also some aspects 
of democracy that Jordanians have not yet seen come to maturity in their country or that 
they do not fully understand when compared with a Western setting. For example, even 
though political parties are legal in Jordan, the IAF being one of them, in a Center for 
Strategic Studies (CSS) poll conducted in 2011 only 54% thought that the freedom to 
form a political party was guaranteed, 30% believed the freedom was not guaranteed, and 
16% did not know (2012, p. 18). This is likely one of the reasons that the IAF faces 
difficulty in sustaining political support, aside from public skepticism of their motives 
and an electoral system that disproportionately allocates seats for less populous tribal 
areas (supportive of the King) over more populous Palestinian urban areas (supportive of 
the JMB and IAF). Approximately 1% of Jordanians affiliate with a political party, 
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although 4% stated they intend to affiliate with a party, movement, or political group in 
the future according to the most recent CSS democracy poll (2012). 
 The future strength of public support for the IAF does have some bright spots, 
even with a political system that limits their ability to attain seats and a public that is still 
growing in maturity in its knowledge of democratic processes and principles. A 
significant portion of the Jordanian population, 37%, believes that religious leaders 
(which could include JMB and IAF leaders) should play a “large” role in politics and 
40% believe they should have some influence (Pew Research Center, 2013, p. 11 and 64). 
Muslims in Jordan also indicated at rate of 46% that Islamic parties were better than other 
political parties in Jordan, 27% said they were same, and 14% said they were worse when 
compared to other parties (Pew Research Center, 2013, p. 66). And finally, in the Arab 
Democracy Barometer survey 48% of Muslims surveyed said that if Jordan were to have 
a political party in which only non-religious parties compete, it would be absolutely 
inappropriate (2011). What these closing statistics mean is that even though political 
party involvement is not currently popular among Jordanians, the opinions and values are 
in place that would appear to lend well to some margin of future political success for the 
IAF and other Islamist parties. 
Results	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  protests	  for	  the	  IAF	  and	  JMB	  
 The concluding portion of this analysis centers on the outcomes of the Jordanian 
Arab Spring for the IAF, JMB, and general protesters. Scholars can only speculate as to 
the future success that the IAF will have in the next election (in which they choose to 
participate) due to their protest leadership during the Arab Spring or whether political 
parties will need to continue to wait for strategic political openings offered by the regime 
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in order to be stronger competitors for parliamentary seats. While the protests from 2011 
to 2013 did cause King Abdullah II to make numerous changes to the office of prime 
minister, to reshuffle his cabinet, amend significant portions of the country’s constitution, 
and sign a new electoral law, these changes did not meet the full demands of protesters 
and could lead to future unrest for the monarchy. 
 One of the main calls for reform from the IAF and JMB during the Arab Spring 
pertained to the “one person, one vote” electoral law that disadvantaged political parties 
in Jordan in favor of tribal groups that have traditionally strong ties to the regime. In 
critical comments towards the Jordanian government, the IAF Secretary General Hamzah 
Mansour stated, “the policy of appointing governments does not enhance political life 
and political parties. Electing governments is a significant step towards democracy” 
(Xinhua News Agency, August 28, 2011). As the IAF and JMB sought to continue to 
pressure the government on the issue of making freer and more fair elections (both for 
themselves and other parties), Jordanians would see a new election law passed in 2012 
that gave the voting eligible population two votes and the option to vote for candidates 
from a national party list. Unsatisfied, however, the IAF still issued complaints that the 
problem of the electoral system’s overrepresentation of rural tribal areas over urban 
populations continued to persist. The dilution of political parties’ power to gain 
parliamentary seats and the IAF’s dissatisfaction with the new electoral law led to the 
boycott of the most recent January 2013 elections by the IAF and several other political 
parties. 
 The strategy of the IAF, JMB, and their coordinating protest movements to 
persistently pressure the regime over accountability for corruption within government and 
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for its slow pace of initiating reforms drew the most responsive actions from the King 
and his government from 2011 to 2013. Since the beginning of 2011, King Abdullah II 
has appointed five different prime ministers to rule over his government and a number of 
ministers resign over allegations related to corruption that occurred under their leadership 
(McClatchy-Tribune Business News, May 31, 2011). Prime ministers’ terms of service 
have traditionally not lasted long in Jordan, however, the pressure of protesters and 
groups like the IAF and JMB during the Arab Spring certainly played a role in an 
unprecedented period of leadership turnover in the government from 2011 to 2013. While 
some investigations and probes were conducted into or completed on corruption 
allegations between 2011 and 2013 it did not appear that such probes led to high a 
number of dismissals of officials from the government. 
 In spite of a period of general unrest in Jordan during and following the Arab 
Spring, the protests remained relatively peaceful and King Abdullah II was able to remain 
in power and not give away much of his power to parliament or political parties. Some of 
the protest movements’ recent demands (including those pre-2011) were met during the 
period from 2011 to 2013: 
 In the committee’s proposal, the amendments included several of the opposition’s 
demands over the last few years: the establishment of a constitutional court, an 
independent electoral commission and a restriction of the government’s ability to 
pass temporary laws in the absence of Parliament (The Jordan Times, September 
19, 2011). 
By the end of reported protests for 2013, some portions of the Jordanian constitution had 
been amended and the January 2013 elections still took place as planned despite the 
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boycott of the IAF and some other small political parties. These results show that even 
though the protests led to some concessions from the government during this period, the 
IAF and JMB did not achieve all of their protest goals, including reform for direct 
popular election of the Jordanian senate, and they subsequently did not generate political 
outcomes that appeared likely to bring more Jordanian support to their party and 
movement. Finally, the protest drive and opposition support also began to degenerate by 
early 2013 as the Syrian civil war and fuel prices increasingly drew the attention of 
Jordanians over concerns for government reform, and the ouster of the Muslim 
Brotherhood leaders of Egypt and July provided a cautionary note to the JMB in planning 
future activities and protests in their country. 
 
Conclusion 
 This analysis of the case of Jordan during the Arab Spring showed that the IAF 
party continues to undergo political movement learning as it navigates a constricted 
political sphere. The IAF and the JMB both coordinated a significant upsurge in protest 
activity over the course of two to two and a half years from 2011 to 2013, which 
pressured the Hashemite monarch and his administration to meet head on the movements’ 
calls for reform. The unique protest data compiled for this research highlights the 
continuum of strategic adaptation by the IAF and JMB, focused on by Brown (2012), to 
move away from promotion of further implementation of shari‘a towards more broadly 
appealing reforms. During the Arab Spring, the main issue areas touted by these Islamist 
movements were electoral reform, government accountability on corruption, and 
provisions for greater press and media freedom. 
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 Although results were far from conclusive, the area of ideational change identified 
by Wickham (2013) was explored to examine the IAF’s and JMB’s political and social 
movement learning and their willingness to partner with ideologically different political 
parties and reform movements during the Arab Spring protests. Although Clark shows 
reason to be skeptical about cross-ideological cooperation of the IAF with other parties as 
a cause of ideational change, the willingness to coordinate with other parties cannot be 
wholly discounted as it provides some evidence of the IAF and JMB being ideologically 
open to other views (2006).  The promotion of democratic principles (e.g., individual and 
press freedoms) and processes by IAF leaders in particular could also indicate a mixture 
of strategic adaptation and ideational change within the IAF as this rhetoric aligns well 
with the Jordanian population’s positive views of democracy seen in the Arab Democracy 
Barometer survey (2011). 
 From the survey data of other scholars utilized in this paper, it is notable that a 
number of indicators exist that show underlying support for strong Islamist parties in 
Jordan and for the Islamic religion to have an impact on Jordanian politics. The survey 
information on this topic also reveals some contradictions in the Jordanian (and broader 
Middle Eastern) tendency to associate democracy more with economic stability and 
strength than with some democratic ideals like the direct public election of their senate 
and prime minister (Jamal, 2006). And despite some indications of support for Islamist 
politics in Jordan, the knowledge of and support for political parties has not yet matured 
and flourished in the country, partially due to the gerrymandered system established 
under the government’s current electoral law. 
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 As the IAF and JMB work to overcome internal divisions that have plagued the 
party and movement in recent years on decisions of whether or not to participate in the 
government’s imperfect election system or to what degree they should participate in the 
government administration, future research will provide important insights into Islamist 
political movements, particularly as they exist under authoritarian regimes. The original 
compilation of protest data from 2011 to 2013 provided in this research should serve as 
both a helpful informational source for historians and social scientists who conduct 
research on the IAF and JMB but also as evidence that the protest demands of the 
Islamist opposition did matter and have an impact on the Jordanian political system and 
government during the Arab Spring. With a number of protest demands left unfulfilled 
following Jordan’s Arab Spring, it remains to be seen if an urban civic revolution of the 
kind Beissinger described in countries in the former Soviet Union could catch fire in the 
streets of Amman and cause unrest for the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan once again. 
 
Recommendations for future research 
 In order to conduct an updated and more conclusive test of Wickham’s hypothesis 
related to ideational change and strategic adaptation of the IAF with the Jordanian case 
the collection of more longitudinal data with specific questions pointed at understanding 
the Jordanian public’s views of the IAF and other political parties is necessary. The 
forthcoming release this year of data from the next CSS democracy poll, the sixth wave 
of the World Values Survey, and third wave of the Arab Democracy Barometer report 
may aid in finding proxy variables that could also accomplish this objective. The 
collection of in-depth interviews with more IAF and JMB leaders may also shed further 
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light on whether evidence of ideational change within the party and movement can be 
verified. 
 An additional research topic to pursue would be to expand the methods used by 
Beissinger (2013) in the Ukraine to bring to bear data on Jordanian protesters, their age, 
and their commitment to democratic values, to see what the composition of mass protests 
in Jordan looked like during the Arab Spring. If limited data were available in Jordan, 
other Middle East and North Africa countries could also serve as interesting examples. 
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